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No. DA 13-0589 
 
Montana Supreme Court  
 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 10:45a.m., in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 




Mark White, Appellant, and the State of Montana, Appellee, 
argue whether White received the due process rights afforded to him 
under the Montana Constitution. White claims that (1) his absence during 
a critical stage of his trial caused him prejudice; and (2) the State’s 
failure to afford him an initial appearance constituted plain error and 
violated his Constitutional rights. The State argues that this is not an 
appropriate case for the Court to invoke discretionary power of plain 
error review because White had no right to be present during the 
proceeding in question, and White invited or acquiesced to any error that 
may have occurred by his absence from the initial appe rance.  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 
 
 On February 25, 2011, the State of Montana charged Mark 
Nicholas White with assault with a weapon following an incident where 
White allegedly injured a newspaper delivery worker with a knife. White 
has a history of mental illness. Following a medical examination 
completed shortly after his arrest, White was admitted o the Hope House 
for psychiatric treatment and evaluation. During this time, White was 
“overtly psychotic and expressed delusional thoughts . . . was very angry, 
and physically threatened and was hypersexual to staff members.” The 
combination of the danger White posed to others and his refusal of 
recommended treatment prompted the State to initiate nvoluntary 
commitment proceedings.  
 
                                         
1 The facts come from the following documents: (i) Appellant’s Br., State v. White (Mont. April 14, 
2014) (No. DA 13-0589), available at http://perma.cc/U3YY-EBSC; (ii) Appellee’s Br., State v. 
White (Mont. July 14, 2014) (No. DA 13-0589), available at http://perma.cc/DGL8-QP38; (iii) 
Appellant’s Reply Br., State v. White (Mont. July 24, 2014) (No. DA 13-0589), available at 
http://perma.cc/68H-43K2.  
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On February 28, 2011, White had an initial appearance before 
the court. White was present and represented by counsel. After informing 
the court there would be “no benefit” to providing White with the 
advisories mandated by statute,2 defense counsel entered a not guilty plea 
on behalf of White and moved to suspend the proceedings for an 
examination of White’s fitness.3 The district court suspended the hearing, 
ordered White to the Montana State Hospital, and set a r view hearing in 
60 days. White was civilly committed to the Montana State Hospital, 
never having been advised of his statutory rights.4 Pursuant to a court 
order, the hospital began involuntarily medicating White. 
 
 The court held status review hearings regarding White’s 
commitment on April 25, 2011, May 23, 2011, and July 11, 2011. 
Although White was represented by counsel at each hearing, he was 
never physically present for any of these hearings. At each hearing the 
State sought and received a continuance because Montana State Hospital 
had not completed White’s fitness examination. During this time, White 
remained committed at the Montana State Hospital. White did not 
believe he was mentally ill and continued to be involuntarily medicated. 
 
On August 1, 2011, nearly six months after his first and only 
appearance before the district court, the court declar d White unfit to 
proceed. Again, White was represented by counsel but not physically 
present at that hearing. On October 24, 2011, the district court received 
an updated fitness evaluation and declared White fit to proceed. White 
was convicted at trial of assault with a weapon. He then filed a timely 
appeal. 
 
The Court has framed the issue in this appeal as whether White’s 
conviction of assault with a weapon must be vacated un er the plain 
error doctrine because (1) he was not advised of his rights at his initial 
appearance, and (2) he was not present at all critical stages of the 
proceedings against him.5 
                                         
2 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–7–102 (2013). 
3 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–14–202. 
4 Mont. Code Ann. § 46-7-102. 
5 Mont. Jud. Branch, Judicial Branch, Oral Argument Schedule, http://courts.mt.gov/oral_cal.mcpx 
(accessed Oct. 24, 2014). 
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III. A RGUMENTS FROM THE PARTIES’  BRIEFS 
 
A. White’s arguments on appeal6 
  
 1. The District Court violated White’s constitutional rights by 
holding a competency hearing—a critical stage in his trial—when White 
was not personally present. 
 
 The right for a criminal defendant to be personally present 
during all critical stages of a trial is a fundamental right contained in the 
Montana Constitution.7 White argues all steps in a criminal proceeding 
that may substantially prejudice the defendant are critical stages. The 
right attaches under two circumstances: (1) whenever anything is done 
which may in any manner affect a defendant’s rights; and (2) whenever a 
defendant’s “presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the 
fullness of his opportunity to defend against the carge.”8 White argues a 
waiver of this right requires the defendant to voluntarily, intelligently, 
and knowingly make a statement to the court waiving his right to be 
present.  
 
Addressing the harmless error standard of review, which White 
believes appropriate, White argues any hearing that constitutes a “critical 
stage” held in his absence without first acquiring a valid waiver from him 
is not harmless error if there is a “reasonable possibility” that his absence 
caused him prejudice.9 If the error resulting from his absence is not 
harmless, it is proper to overturn the conviction and remand for new trail. 
  
 Here, White argues the August 11 hearing during which e was 
declared unfit to proceed was a critical stage in his trial under Montana 
law because the further postponement of the trial affected his rights. 
White never waived his right to be present at this hearing. According to 
White, holding this hearing outside of his presence pr judiced him in 
three ways: (1) he did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor 
of the parties, hear any arguments, or judge communicate with his 
counsel; (2) he did not have chance to argue he was actually mentally fit; 
and (3) he did not have the opportunity to argue his fitness over the next 
eight months while being involuntarily medicated at a mental hospital. 
White concludes that because he was prejudiced by his absence from the 
critical August 11 hearing, the District Court’s error in holding the 
                                         
6 All arguments come from the Appellant’s Br. and Appellant’s Reply Br., supra n. 1. 
7 Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. 
8 Br. of Appellant, supra n. 1, at *4 (quoting State v. Charlie, 239 P.3d 934, 944 (Mont. 2010)). 
9 Br. of Appellant, supra n. 1, at *5 (quoting Charlie, 239 P.3d at 944). 
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hearing was not harmless; therefore, his conviction should be vacated 
and his case remanded for a new trail. 
 
 2. The State erred by failing to conduct a constitutionally 
mandated initial appearance and subsequently holding White in custody 
for over six months. 
 
The Montana Constitution indicates that “no person hall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”10 A 
defendant’s right to be timely informed of the charges against him and of 
his basic rights during an initial appearance is a fundamental aspect of 
due process. The basic rights the court is required to apprise the 
defendant of are statutorily defined.11  
 
White argues that although he was not mentally fit to benefit 
from his initial appearance as originally scheduled, the State never held 
another initial appearance or otherwise apprised him of his rights after he 
was declared fit to proceed. White then argues plain error review of this 
decision is warranted because the error (1) raises serious questions about 
fundamental constitutional rights and the fairness of the proceeding; and 
(2) it has resulted in injustice. 
 
White then concludes by arguing the State held him in custody 
and involuntarily medicated him, all without informing him of any of his 
rights as mandated by law and that this constitutes plain error. Therefore, 
White argues, his conviction should be vacated. 
 
B. State’s arguments on appeal12 
  
 1. This Court should not invoke its power of discretionary 
review because no fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred when the 
District Court held the August 1, 2011 hearing outside of White’s 
presence.  
 
The Montana Constitution provides its citizens with a 
fundamental right to be present during all critical stages of a criminal 
trial.13 The State argues that although neither the Montana Supreme 
Court nor the United States Supreme Court have determin d whether a 
competency hearing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, many 
circuits—including the Ninth Circuit—consider these h arings to be 
critical stages because they safeguard a defendant from being tried if he 
                                         
10 Mont. Const. art. II, § 17. 
11 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–7–102. 
12 All arguments come from the Appellee’s Br. and Appellee’s Reply Br., supra n. 1. 
13 Mont. Const. art. II, § 17. 
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is unfit to stand trial and affords him an opportunity assist in his defense 
by observing and consulting with his counsel. The State then argues 
conducting a critical stage hearing outside of the pr sence of the 
defendant is subject to harmless error review. According to the State, if 
no reasonable possibility exists that the defendant’s absence caused him 
prejudice, the Court should not overturn the conviction. 
 
The State then argues that when an Appellant fails to raise a 
constitutional rights issue in a timely manner befor  the trial court, he 
must meet the higher standard of plain error review. According to the 
State, under plain error review, the Appellant has t e burden to show that 
the error, if left unexamined, would result in such a miscarriage of justice 
that the integrity of the judicial system would be called into question. 
 
Examining the facts in this case, the State argues th  hearing on 
August 1, 2011 was not a critical stage of White’s criminal proceeding. 
According to the State, it was not even a required competency hearing. 
The State’s theory is when neither the State nor the defendant contests 
the accuracy of the report a competency hearing is unnecessary. The 
State argues because the neither White nor the State contested the 
findings of the report, the court was not required to hold the August 1, 
2011 hearing; the hearing held on that date was not a competency 
hearing; and therefore, White’s right to attend a competency hearing was 
not affected. The State explains under Montana law,the district court 
could have adopted the report’s findings outside the presence of White’s 
counsel. The State concludes by arguing White has failed to show plain 
error occurred. 
 
Alternatively, the State argues that even if the competency 
hearing was a critical stage of White’s criminal proceeding, he was not 
prejudiced in any way. The State argues that White do s not disagree 
with the court’s adoption of the findings and does not show how his 
absence at the competency hearing affected his ability to defend himself 
at trial. According to the State, White has not shown any prejudice 
occurred from the delay. The State argues White’s ability to understand 
the legal process was serious impaired by the sympto s of White’s 
schizophrenia. Therefore, he had no mental capacity to assist in his 
defense at that time. The State concludes it is unreasonable to believe 
that the outcome of the hearing would have been any different had White 
attended the proceedings. Therefore, White has not met his burden to 
show plain error occurred and accordingly, the Court should affirm his 
conviction. 
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2. White’s counsel invited the very error he now claims warrants 
reversal of this conviction by informing the court not to advise his client 
of his statutory rights.14  
 
Montana law requires the court to inform a criminal defendant of 
the charges against him and his basic rights without unnecessary delay.15 
According to the State an important purpose behind requiring an initial 
appearance is to safeguard against defendants being h ld incommunicado 
or for indefinite periods of time. 
 
The State argues that (1) White’s counsel invited the error that 
now acts as the basis for his request for reversal; and further, (2) White 
had no capacity whatsoever to participate in the suspended initial 
appearance. Furthermore, the State argues White was not incarcerated 
indefinitely without access to counsel. The State points out he was civilly 
committed based, at least in part, on his counsel’s r quest. According to 
the State, White fails to meet his burden to show a fundamental 




 Although the Court frames the issue in this appeal as whether 
White’s conviction of assault with a weapon must be vacated under the 
plain error doctrine because (1) he was not advised of his rights at his 
initial appearance, and (2) he was not present at all critical stages of the 
proceedings against him,16 the Court likely granted oral argument to 
answer the question of first impression of whether under Montana law, 
an uncontested competency hearing is a critical stage of a criminal 
proceeding.17 
 
 Because the Court defines a critical stage as “anystep in the 
proceeding that has the potential to substantially prejudice the 
defendant,”18 it is likely a contested hearing that seeks to determine if a 
defendant is fit to stand trial qualifies. The State essentially concedes the 
point. However, the State’s argument—that because White’s lack of 
mental fitness was not disputed, the hearing was not required and cannot 
be considered a critical stage—will likely be a point the justices ask the 
State to expand on during oral argument. The persuasiveness of the 
answers to questions surrounding this issue will likely prove dispositive. 
                                         
14 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–7–102(1). 
15 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–7–101(1). 
16 Mont. Jud. Branch, Judicial Branch, Oral Argument Schedule, supra n. 5.  
17 See Charlie, 239 P.3d at 944; State v. Peters, 405 P.2d 642, 647 (Mont. 1965). 
18 Charlie, 239 P.3d at 944. 
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Barring a strong showing by counsel for the State, it is likely the Court 
will rule any hearing that determines a defendant’s fitness to stand trial is 
a critical stage regardless whether competence is disputed by either 
party. Because one of the protections the right provides is the ability for a 
defendant to assist in and observe his defense, the Court will likely be 
unmoved by the fact that White was represented at the hearing by 
counsel.  
 
 The parties disagree on the proper standard of review for White’s 
critical stage argument. White argues that a harmless error standard is 
appropriate. The State counters that a plain error standard should be 
applied. The Court will likely ask both parties about their arguments for 
either standard. 
 
Finally, given the high bar that plain error review requires White 
to clear, it is unlikely that his argument regarding the failure of the State 
to apprise him of his rights during an initial appearance will carry the 
day. The Court is likely to ask White to explain how a miscarriage of 
justice resulted when the district court followed the advice of White’s 
own counsel in not apprising him of his rights during an initial 
appearance he actually attended. The State’s argument that White was 
not without access to counsel and, at least in part, was committed at his 
own request, will likely be difficult for White to vercome.  
   
Lower Court: Gallatin County Cause No. TK 11-629; Honorable Mike 
Salvagni, District Court Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial District.  
 
Attorneys for Appellant, Mark Nicholas White: Wade Zolynski, Chief 
Appellate Defender; Gregory Hood, Assistant Appellat  Defender. 
 
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Montana: Timothy C. Fox, Montana 
Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler, Appellate Services Bureau Chief; 
Tammy A. Hinderman, Assistant Attorney General.  
 
